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In September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European union (CJEU) delivered its 
judgement in Joined cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v Council1 
concerning the validity of the Decision 2015/1601 (hereinafter ‘contested decision’) 
establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of 
Italy and Greece. 
At the heart of the decision was the principle of solidarity among Member States of 
the Union. The objective of this dissertation is to understand solidarity in the European 
Union (EU) legal framework, in primary and secondary law within the Area of Freedom, 
Security, and Justice (hereinafter ‘AFSJ’), and as entrenched in the Common European 
Asylum System (hereinafter ‘CEAS’); and, in the end, the consequences of solidarity in the 
relocation obligations towards Member States in light with the CJEU’s case-law. 
The above-mentioned decision was part of several measures taken by the Union to 
address the ‘so-called’ migration crisis of 2015, consequently establishing temporary 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece in 
accordance with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities among 
European States. In fact, due to their geographical location, southern countries which have 
the Union’s external borders, such as Italy and Greece, became the main territories affected 
by the migration inflow because of their proximity to the Mediterranean Sea. Their 
vulnerable position translated into a massive increase of arrivals of third-country nationals 
in their territory. Over time, Italy and Greece were not able to address this flow and their 
asylum systems suffered extreme pressure. The application processes for international 
protection and the appropriate reception conditions were not being dealt effectively or duly 
respected. Consequently, their asylum systems collapsed and the entrance of asylum seekers 
and migrants, through Europe, became impossible to monitor and control.  
                                                          
1 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631. 
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The situation that took place in Europe in 2014 and the beginning of 2015 brought 
an awareness for the need of responses from the EU institutions and Member States, as well 
international organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations, with Europe calling for 
internal solidarity and a holistic approach to the migration crisis. 2 In this context, JUNKER, 
the president of the European Commission stated that “[w]e need more Europe in our 
asylum policy. We need more Union in our refugee policy. A true European refugee and 
asylum policy requires solidarity to be permanently anchored in our policy approach and 
our rules.”3 In 2016, JUNKER reiterated that “[s]olidarity is the glue that keeps our Union 
together”.4 
The truth is that solidarity is one of the Union’s cardinal principals and it is stressed 
throughout its legal framework. However, some Member States – those which are part of the 
so-called “Visegrad group”5 – have disregarded this principle, especially due to political 
reasons whereas other Member States, because of the migration inflow and continuous 
arrivals of third-country nationals, are asking for more solidarity in the Union. Nonetheless, 
the latter’s claims were neither unanimously nor effectively answered by the EU. The failure 
of the relocation decisions illustrates the failure to implement solidarity in the European 
Union.  
The decision by the CJEU in Slovakia and Hungary v Council is remarkable since it 
upheld the legal enforceability of solidarity in asylum policies. All Member States are bound 
by EU law obligations, even if those obligations are contrary to their national interests. As a 
core principle of the Union, solidarity binds its Member States to act in accordance with it. 
This principle cannot be neglected. On the contrary, it is to be reaffirmed and emphasised 
by all the Union institutions and its Member States. In fact, without solidarity, the very 
essence and existence of the EU is at stake.  
Taking the above into account, this dissertation is divided into three main chapters. 
Firstly, I will look at the solidarity principle entrenched in EU primary law, i.e., how the 
Treaties have established an obligation of solidarity throughout several references and its 
inter-relation with the principle of sincere cooperation. Secondly, I will address solidarity 
                                                          
2 European Parliament, Resolution of 17 December 2014 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need 
for a holistic EU approach to migration (OJ C 294, 12.8.2016). 
3 State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity, Strasbourg, 9 September 2015, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5614_en.htm. 
4 State of the Union Address 2016: Towards a better Europe - a Europe that protects, empowers and defends, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3042_en.htm. 
5 Check Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.  
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within the AFSJ, in particular in light of Articles 67(2) and 80 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The implementation of solidarity in EU 
secondary law will be dealt with in the second part. In this scope, and in order to understand 
how solidarity is realised, it is pivotal to understand the CEAS and its legal framework within 
which solidarity is operationalised by legislative acts. The following three legislative 
instruments will be further explained as practical tools of solidarity: (i) the Dublin System, 
(ii) the Temporary Protection Directive, and (iii) Relocation measures. In the last part of this 
dissertation, I will deal with the decision by the CJEU in Slovakia and Hungary v Council 
in regards to the establishment of a practical compensatory instrument of solidarity, a 
relocation mechanism taken in order to address the migration crisis of 2015. It is my intention 
to better understand the Court’s position on solidarity as a guiding principle of the European 
asylum policies and, more globally, the duties which follow from the aforementioned 
principle towards the Member States. The judgement of the Court covers several legal issues, 
however, for the matter of this dissertation, only the substantive pleas relating to the principle 















1. Solidarity as a General Principle of EU Law 
 
1.1 Solidarity in the EU Treaties  
 
The idea of solidarity was an important pillar in the creation of the European project 
from the very beginning. Robert Schuman, in his speech of 9 May 1950, stated that “Europe 
will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”6 
The European integration project was developed on the basis of solidarity as a 
fundamental value to promote peace and develop integration among European Members. 7  
Solidarity was first stated within the preamble of the Treaty of Paris, which 
established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, that “Europe can be built only 
by concrete actions which create a real solidarity”. In the Treaty of Rome, which established 
the European Economic Community, the term also appeared in the preamble as “solidarity 
which binds Europe and overseas countries, and desiring to ensure the development of their 
prosperity”. It was further introduced in the preambular part of the Single European Act of 
1986 and in the preamble of the Maastricht Treaty (“to deepen the solidarity between their 
peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions”).  
The Lisbon Treaty expanded solidarity beyond the references in the preamble, 
embodying solidarity in several provisions throughout different areas of policies. 8 In this 
sense, the Treaty of Lisbon transformed solidarity into “a value binding together Member 
States and as a value binding together the citizens of each and every Member State”.9 As 
mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union (‘TEU’), in which the Union 
values are upheld, solidarity is placed as one of the Union’s foundational values. Article 3 
TEU makes several references to solidarity in relation to the Union’s objectives and recalls 
“solidarity between generations” and “solidarity among Member States”. In the areas of 
the Union’s external action, Common Foreign and Security Policy references to solidarity 
were emphasised in Articles 21(1), 24(2) and 24(3) TEU. Article 24 (3) TEU recalls the 
“spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” and need for the Member States to work “together 
                                                          
6 The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1959, available at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en. 
7 See A. Sangiovanni, “Solidarity in the European Union”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33, 2013. 
8 The reference in the preambular part of the Lisbon Treaty is identical to the one in the Maastricht Treaty. 
9 A. Sangiovanni, “Solidarity in the European Union”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33, 2013, p.2. 
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to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity.” In Article 31 TEU, “mutual 
solidarity” is referred to as the adoption of legislative acts and in Article 32 TEU as the 
commitment and international actions done by Member States.  
In the TFEU, solidarity encompasses all the policies within the AFSJ with Articles 
67(2) and 80, and these will be considered below. Solidarity was also placed in economic 
and energy areas, (cf. Articles 122 and 194 TFEU). More visibly, solidarity was introduced 
in Title VII of Article 222 TFEU, entitled the ‘Solidarity Clause’, which provides that if a 
Member State is victim of a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster, “[t]he Union 
and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity’. Indeed, these references 
cover “multidimensional aspects of solidarity”.10   
Also, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter, ‘The 
Charter’) codified solidarity in its preamble, as “indivisible, universal values” and placed 
the principle in its Chapter IV (‘Solidarity’), where several social rights are determined.  
Despite all the references mentioned in different constitutional instruments, none of 
them provide any legal definition of solidarity. In fact, solidarity is a contested concept 
through its interdisciplinary approaches and there is no single definition for it.  
The several references to solidarity in the current Treaties raise several questions of 
what is meant to be understood by solidarity and its normative force. Furthermore, they are 
expressed in different policy areas which can be translated into different meanings.  
In order to understand what solidarity entails, it is necessary to interpret the 
normative context in each field of application. Therefore, it is complex to create a single 
meaning of solidarity, with different approaches leading to conflicting ideas and 
commitments of solidarity among the Member States and the EU institutions. The truth is 
that solidarity, as a core, fundamental value of the EU, must be created over time. Similarly, 
the integration process is one that “necessarily has to remain unfinished”.11 Indeed, “[t]here 
is no such thing as solidarity unless it is practiced, regardless of the underlying definition of 
what it means to act in solidarity”.12 
                                                          
10 B. Beutler, “Solidarity in the EU: A Critique of Solidarity and of the EU”, in A. Grimmel and S. My Giand 
(eds.), Solidarity in the European Union - A Fundamental Value in Crisis, Cham, Springer International 
Publishing, 2017, p.30. 
11 A. Grimmel and S. My Giand, “Introduction: Solidarity Lost? The European Union and the Crisis of One of 
Its Core Values”, in A. Grimmel and S. My Giand (eds.), Solidarity in the European Union - A Fundamental 
Value in Crisis, Cham, Springer International Publishing, 2017, p.2. 
12 Ibid. 
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  Taking this into account, the intention of this dissertation is not to provide a meaning 
for solidarity by analysing the historical approaches and the normative concept of 
solidarity,13 but to understand solidarity obligations underlying relocation measures, taking 
into account both EU primary and secondary law within the AFSJ, particularly in light of 
the case-law of the CJEU. Nonetheless, I will start by explaining the meaning of solidarity 
as expressed in the Treaties, particularly within the AFSJ; afterwards I will address solidarity 
as entrenched in the CEAS; and, lastly, the consequences of solidarity in the relocation 
obligations towards Member States in light with the CJEU’s case-law.  
 
1.2 Solidarity and the Principle of Sincere Cooperation  
 
KÜÇÜK states that “the principle of loyalty is one of the most evident expressions of 
the Member States’ commitment to solidarity.”14 In order to comprehend solidarity in the 
EU, it is essential to additionally understand the principle of sincere cooperation (also known 
as loyalty or the loyalty principle), which is intertwined with and strictly related to solidarity. 
Both have also been crucial for the development of European integration.  
The principle of sincere cooperation is placed in Article 4(3) of TEU, which reads:  
“Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the 
acts of the institutions of the Union.  
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.” 
The principle of loyalty binds the “Union and the Member States” to duties of 
respect, mutual assistance, and cooperation. It creates a positive obligation where the Union 
and its Member States are to carry out the obligations established in the Treaties. In the 
second paragraph, it recalls Member States “to take any appropriate measures” in order to 
                                                          
13 For more see: M. Ross and Y. Borgmann-Prebil (eds.), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010; and A.Grimmel and S. My Giand (eds.), Solidarity in the European Union - A 
Fundamental Value in Crisis, Cham, Springer International Publishing, 2017. 
14 E. Küçük, “Solidarity in EU Law: An Elusive Political Statement or a Legal Principle with Substance?”, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23, 2016, p.974. 
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fulfil positive obligations “arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union.”  In paragraph 3, the principle creates a negative obligation, where 
Member States “shall (…) refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment 
of the Union's objectives.” 
Member States must fulfil obligations that arise from their membership to the EU. 
As Article 4(3) TEU settled, Member States have agreed to comply with primary and 
secondary obligations. Therefore, a legal obligation to act within solidarity stems from the 
principle of sincere cooperation since solidarity is placed as a value and objective of the 
Union. In the earlier case-law of the CJEU, in Commission v. France, the principle of loyalty 
was already interconnected with solidarity.15 In this case, France adopted unilaterally state 
aid rules in the exercise of its reserved competences which could not neglect the principle of 
loyalty. The CJEU affirmed that:  
“[t]he solidarity which is at the basis of these obligations as of the whole of the 
Community system in accordance with the undertaking provided for in Article 5 of 
the Treaty, is continued for the benefit of the States in the procedure for mutual 
assistance provided for in Article 108 where a Member State is seriously threatened 
with difficulties as regards its balance of payments”.16 
Similarly, in Commission v Italy, where Italy failed to adopt a community system 
concerning the Common Agricultural Policy, the CJEU held that: 
“[t]his failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their 
adherence to the Community strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community legal 
order.” 
 Even if against its “own conception of national interest”, Member States must act 
in accordance with EU law.17 
The principle of sincere cooperation and the principle of solidarity have been 
confused and there are those who argue that there are no legal differences between them or 
claim that the former is an expression of the latter.18 However, the principle of sincere 
cooperation addresses the vertical relations of the Union and its Member States, as well as 
the horizontal dimension regarding relations among Member States. Notwithstanding, the 
principle of loyalty is more observant of the vertical dimension of the Union and its Member 
                                                          
15 Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69, Commission v. France, EU:C:1969:68.  
16 Ibid., para.16.  
17 Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy, EU:C:1973:13, paras. 24 and 25. 
18 See M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.35-41.  
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States, therefore, obligations that arise from the EU institutions to the Member States. 19 The 
principle of sincere cooperation is one of the main principles which guides this vertical 
relation, whereas solidarity by its references in the Treaty mainly addresses the horizontal 
relationship between Member States, called “interstate solidarity”.  There are other 
dimensions of solidarity, however for the matter of this dissertation, interstate solidarity, also 
named as state-centred solidarity, is the one in question.20 
Moreover, solidarity entails political components in contrast with loyalty which 
“does not apply to the political decision-making in the Council. It does, however, bind the 
Union institutions in both procedural and legal basis matters.”21 As will be shown, 
solidarity is applied within the decision-making process when developing policies in the EU. 
Similarly, the principle of mutual trust is also strictly related to solidarity. For 
instance, mutual trust was at the heart of the Schengen Agreement when internal boarders 
were open, as well as throughout the development of the CEAS. Member States also trust 
each other on the fulfilment of their obligations imposed by EU primary or secondary law.  
Even without a clear notion of solidarity, it undoubtedly entails and is complemented 
by loyalty and mutual trust among its Members, so “solidarity interlocks, but does not 
overlap, with the principles of loyalty and mutual trust.”22  
 
1.3 Solidarity within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Articles 
67(2) and 80 TFEU 
 
Solidarity is mentioned in EU primary law within the field of the AFSJ, particularly 
Articles 67(2) and 80 TFEU. The ASFJ is established in Title V of Part III of TFEU. It covers 
policies of visa and border controls, irregular migration, legal migration, asylum, and judicial 
cooperation in criminal and civil matters and police cooperation. 
                                                          
19 “Union loyalty is less about the (horizontal) bond between individuals or states and more about defining the 
vertical relationship between the Union and the Member States.”, in M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in 
EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.40.  
20 For the different dimensions of solidarity see: M. Knodt and A. Tews, “European Solidarity and Its Limits: 
Insights from Current Political Challenges”, in A. Grimmel and S. My Giand (eds.), Solidarity in the European 
Union - A Fundamental Value in Crisis, Cham, Springer International Publishing, 2017, p.48-55. 
21 M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p.84. 
22 D. Thym and E. Tsourdi, “Searching for solidarity in the EU asylum and border policies: constitutional and 
operational dimensions”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(5), 2017, p.612. 
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The AFSJ has been subject to significant policy and institutional developments. 
These policies belonged to the Member State’s sovereignty until 1991, with Member States 
having exclusive control over these sensitive areas, at the time the area of ‘Justice and Home 
Affairs’ (hereinafter ‘JHA’) which included the policies of asylum, immigration, and third-
country nationals. 
JHA policies were included in the Union’s constitutional framework at the time of 
the Maastricht Treaty which, based on a pillar structure, placed JHA issues within its third 
pillar.23 Afterwards, in Amsterdam, some of the policies included in the JHA competences 
were moved into the first pillar, that of the European Community. The Lisbon Treaty 
abolished the pillar structure and, in 2009, the JHA policies were again reunited, this time 
under the head of the European Union in the AFSJ, now placed in Title V of Part III of 
TFEU, as previously mentioned.24 Since then, under Articles 2(2) and 4 (2)(j) TFEU, the 
ASFJ become a shared competence between the Union and its Member States.  
The principle of solidarity has been implied in the construction and evolution of the 
AFSJ. In fact, solidarity has been present in documents that have developed the AFSJ such 
as the Tampere conclusions in 199925, the Hague Programme in 200426, the European Pact 
on Immigration and Asylum in 200827, and the Stockholm Programme in 200928. 
Solidarity was first mentioned in Article 63(2)(b) of the EC Treaty, which introduced 
a vague formulation implying the principle of solidarity as: “promoting a balance of effort 
between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and 
displaced persons”. Later, in the drafting of the Treaty for a Constitution for Europe, the 
European Convention working group suggested the inclusion of solidarity within the area of 
JHA. Despite the Constitutional Treaty not being successful, in 2009 the Lisbon Treaty 
included the principle of solidarity in Article 67(2) and 80 TFUE. 
                                                          
23 The Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union established on three pillars: i) the European 
Communities; ii) the Common Foreign and Security Policies; and iii) Cooperation in the fields of justice and 
home affairs. 
24 For the evolution of JHA see: S. Peers, “Mission accomplished? EU Justice and Home Affairs Law after the 
Treaty of Lisbon”, Common Market Law Review, 48, 2013, p.661-693. 
25 E.g., Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 
1999, SN 200/99. 
26 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
European Union, 2005 (OJ C 53/1). 
27 Council of the European Union, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, EU Doc. 13440/08, 24 Sep. 
2008. 
28 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting the Citizens, 2010 (OJ C 115/1). 
12 
On the one hand, within the general provisions of AFSJ, Article 67(2) makes a 
reference to solidarity, stating that: 
“It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame 
a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on 
solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For 
the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country 
nationals.”  
The provision covers the subfields of the common policy on migration issues: border 
checks, asylum, and immigration. The Article recalls a common approach of the Union 
which must be based on solidarity among Member States (the so-called “interstate 
solidarity”). It makes a general reference to solidarity where the Union shall develop a 
common policy action in the spirit of solidarity between Member States. As someone has 
put it, said Article “plays a programmatic role, offering political directions”, but it does not 
create binding legal obligations due to its general character.29  
On the other hand, Article 80 of TFEU has a much more complex legal structure than 
the provision of 67(2) TFEU. In order to better understand this Article, we must address its 
main components. According to Article 80 TFEU, reads as follows: 
“The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including 
its financial implications, between Member States. Whenever necessary, the acts of 
the Union adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to 
give effect to this principle.” 
The provision settles the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. It 
applies to policy areas on border checks, immigration, and asylum established in Articles 77 
to 79 of TFEU. 
Thus, Article 80 creates a positive obligation for the EU Institutions and Member 
States in agreement with which they must act according to the principle of solidarity and 
ensure the fair sharing of responsibilities when developing and implementing the common 
policy on border checks, immigration, and asylum. Furthermore, it creates concrete duties 
such as the creation of measures that give the appropriate effect to the principle “whenever 
                                                          
29 E. Tsourdi, “Solidarity at work? The prevalence of emergency-driven solidarity in the administrative 
governance of the Common European Asylum System”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 24(5), 2017, p. 672.  
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necessary”. 30 The last sentence of the provision recalls the principle of proportionality and 
subsidiarity, therefore, solidarity measures must be balanced with other constitutional 
principles of the Union. 31  
This provision does not bind EU institutions to any specific measure, but they are 
bound to promote solidarity and fairness in burden sharing. Thus, the European legislator 
has a large margin of discretion when putting into effect the principle of solidarity through 
secondary law, since the wording in this Article is generally vague and abstract.32 In that 
regard, Article 80 TFEU provides a guideline to the European legislator for the 
operationalisation of solidarity, depending on the specific circumstances.33 Solidarity can be 
operationalised in different ways, although the provision refers to only one of the several 
expressions of solidarity: financial solidarity. The “financial implications” imply the burden 
sharing of costs of the common policy among Member States, a material element that has 
always been a constituent part of the notion of solidarity.34 
Article 80 TFEU applies both to the Union Institutions and its Member States. As 
MORENO-LAX concluded: “[t]he article not only provides a general framework for political 
deliberations and policy decisions, as a programmatic guideline of sorts, but constitutes a 
central structural imperative requiring the Union to act to guarantee suitable (solidarity-
proof) outcomes”.35 Solidarity measures depend on the implementation and reliance of the 
Member States, consequently, the Member States acting independently within the 
framework established by the Union must fulfil their legal obligations of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibilities.36  
The role played by sincere cooperation and mutual trust among Member States is 
essential when implementing solidarity. Article 80 TFEU should be read jointly with Article 
4(3) TEU of the principle of sincere cooperation since Member States must comply and 
implement Union law and should not jeopardise its objectives by strengthening solidarity 
and fair sharing actions. As highlighted in the paper by the European Commission on 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p.675. 
32 E. Küçük, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window 
Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, p.454-456. 
33 E. Karageorgiou, “The Law and Practice of Solidarity in the CEAS: Article 80 TFEU and its Added Value”, 
European Policy Analysis Issue, 14, 2016, p.10. 
34 J. Bast, “Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law”, European Public 
Law, 22, 2016, p. 293. 
35 V. Moreno-Lax, “Solidarity’s reach: meaning, dimensions and implications for EU (external) asylum 
policy”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(5), 2017, p.751. 
36 E. Karageorgiou, “The Law and Practice of Solidarity in the CEAS: Article 80 TFEU and its Added Value”, 
European Policy Analysis Issue, 14, 2016, p.6. 
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enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum: “[t]he success of the Union’s solidarity 
measures depends on the engagement and cooperation of all stakeholders.”37  
As mentioned before, the provision of Article 80 TFEU associated solidarity with 
fair sharing of responsibilities, despite these being two different concepts. However, the 
provision mentions one single principle, solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities. The 
responsibility emphasised in the Article means that it can be shared by the Member States 
since “it relates to the part of the common burden and the joint effort required to obtain a 
common objective.”38 As MORENO-LAX affirms, the provision establishes “the general 
value-principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility within EU asylum policy” 
which means that both concepts are linked, since Article 80 entails the general principle of 
solidarity as a motivating factor for the fair sharing of responsibility, the latter being the 
consequence of the former.39 Therefore, solidarity must be accomplished by fair sharing 
responsibilities among Member States. 
The concept of fair sharing is also contested because it is related to notions of justice 
and equity which gives the European legislator some margin of discretion.40 KÜÇÜK argues 
that the fairness element “somewhat amplifies the concept of solidarity and defines its nature 
and limits.” Therefore, the policies taken by the legislator are decided in regards to the 
specific case, where interests must be balanced in order to prevent inequalities.41 This 
element establishes an obligation of result, according to which each Member State has to 
contribute to the fair share of responsibilities and they must be reasonably shared among the 
Member States.42 TSOURDI affirms also that “the fair-sharing of responsibility makes 
solidarity in asylum policy a ‘solidarity plus’”.43  
                                                          
37 COM(2011) 835 final, European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum, A EU agenda for better responsibility-sharing and more 
mutual trust, Brussels, 2.12.2011, p.13. 
38 H. Rosenfeld, “The European Border and Coast Guard in Need of Solidarity: Reflections on the Scope and 
Limits of Article 80 TFEU” (March 31, 2017), in: Mitsilegas V, Moreno-Lax V and Vavoula N (eds): 
Securitising Asylum: Extraterritoriality and Human Rights Challenges, Brill 2017, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2944116. 
39 V. Moreno-Lax, “Solidarity’s reach: meaning, dimensions and implications for EU (external) asylum 
policy”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 24(5), 2017, p.751. 
40 P. De Bruycker and E. Tsourdi, “The Bratislava Declaration on migration: European irresponsibility instead 
of solidarity”, available at http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-bratislava-declaration-on-migration/ (last 
accessed on 27 July 2018). 
41 E. Küçük, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window 
Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, p.455- 458. 
42 E. Tsourdi, “Solidarity at work? The prevalence of emergency-driven solidarity in the administrative 
governance of the Common European Asylum System”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 24(5), 2017, p.673-674. 
43 Ibid.  
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The CJEU was called to provide some guidance to Article 80 TFEU, in the context 
of the Dublin System, which will be analysed below. In Halaf, an Iraqi national applied for 
asylum in Bulgaria, but had previously lodged an asylum application in Greece. Therefore, 
under the Dublin Regulation II, he should have been transferred to the Member State where 
he first lodged his application. The Bulgarian authorities did not consider his asylum 
application and returned him back to Greece. The Iraqi national appealed. The Bulgarian 
National Court referred a preliminary reference asking whether the sovereignty clause of 
Dublin Regulation II was to be interpreted under the scope of Article 80 TFEU, regardless 
of the absence of any provision in the Dublin Regulation concerning said Article.44 The 
CJEU refrained entirely from mentioning Article 80 TFEU and the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility by referring to the question that “the exercise of that option 
is not subject to any particular condition” (cf. para. 36). It mentioned the preparatory 
documents of that regulation where it was established that “the rule in Article 3(2) of the 
Regulation was introduced in order to allow each Member State to decide sovereignly, for 
political, humanitarian or practical considerations, to agree to examine an application for 
asylum even if it is not responsible under the criteria in the Regulation.” (cf. para. 37). 
Therefore, the CJEU merely responded whether “a member state could process an 
application under the sovereignty clause”, and not to the question “whether it should do so 
under certain conditions”, pursuant to Article 80.45 
In N.S, two applicants were returned to Greece due to the rule of automatic 
transferences established in Dublin Regulation II, based on the principle of mutual trust 
among Member States. The CJEU held that: 
“[a]rticle 80 TFEU provides that asylum policy and its implementation are to be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including 
its financial implications, between the Member States.” 46  
Furthermore, the CJEU concluded that the fundamental rights of asylum seekers 
might be at risk with the system of automatic returns.47 In this judgement, the CJEU 
mentioned Article 80 TFEU as governing EU asylum policies but did not develop it further. 
Nevertheless, as affirmed by KÜÇÜK, even if the Court has refrained from interpreting the 
                                                          
44 Case C‑528/11, Halaf, ECLI:EU:C:2013:342, para. 25(1). 
45 E. Küçük, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window 
Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, p. 464.  
46 Joined Cases C 411/10 and C 493/10, N.S. and M.E., EU:C:2011:865, para.93. 
47 Ibid., see paras. 81,86, 94, 99,100 and 104. 
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EU asylum law in light of the above provision, the principle must serve as “a standard of 
review and as an interpretation tool”.48  
The development of Article 80 TFEU as a legal basis for the establishment of 
solidarity mechanisms will be seen further in Chapter 3, in Slovakia and Hungary v Council. 
However, the implementation of solidarity in the European Asylum Policy will be addressed 
first.  
 
2. Implementation of Solidarity in the European Asylum Policy 
 
After analysing solidarity expressed in EU primary law, it is now pivotal to 
understand the CEAS and how solidarity has been realised within this system. Solidarity has 
been defined as a constitutional value and a guiding principle of the European asylum law. 
49 As seen above, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU, the CEAS must implement and 
realise solidarity through different tools and instruments. However, as will be shown below, 
some of these instruments do not promote solidarity. Indeed, they create an imbalance of 
burdens among Member States and, as a result, compensatory measures are required to be 
taken by the Union. Thus, solidarity has prevailed as an emergency-driven policy instead of 
one for governing the common area.   
 
2.1 The Common European Asylum System  
 
The CEAS is the Union’s legal framework which governs asylum of third-country 
nationals in the EU. The aim of the CEAS was to harmonise common standards for asylum 
seekers within the national legislation of Member States, reducing the differences between 
national legal systems. The EU framework reflects international obligations under 
International Refugee Law, namely the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol.   
                                                          
48 E. Küçük, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window 
Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, p. 463-464; see also: V. Mitsilegas, “Solidarity and Trust in the 
Common European Asylum System”, Comparative Migration Studies, 2, 2014, p.189. 
49 “Solidarity is one of the fundamental values of the European Union and has been a guiding principle of the 
common European asylum policy since the start of its development in 1999.”, in COM(2011) 835 final, p.2. 
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The asylum jurisdiction within the EU was implemented gradually, with the 
Schengen Agreement in 1985 introducing some initial rules regarding asylum and migration 
issues. When the Union decided to create the single market, the freedom of movement of 
persons (EU citizens) was established among the Union. Meanwhile, the Schengen Area was 
created where some Member States agreed to the removal of internal border controls and 
people started to move freely within the territory of the Union. 50 Consequently, there is a 
link between the asylum and migration policies since the external European borders led to 
common borders to all the Member States and therefore, third-country nationals entering 
into the EU and decisions granting asylum or international protection became a common 
concern to all Member States. Therefore, a common and coordinated response was needed: 
a European asylum system. 
In this ambit, the Dublin Convention adopted in 1990 focused on the responsibility 
of Member States for asylum claims. Later, in 1999, in the so-called ‘Amsterdam era’, the 
Union decided to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’, at the Tampere European 
Council. The Union established two phases in order to achieve said common policy. 
The ‘first phase’ of commitments through legislation was made between 2003 and 2005, 
with the adoption of the Directives on reception conditions, procedural rules, the content and 
qualification of refugees, subsidiary protection status, and the so-called “Temporary 
Protection Directive”.51 The Dublin Regulation II, a reform of the Dublin System, emerged 
in 2003 and a complemented regulation was adopted, creating the EURODAC database. In 
2004, a second phase was initiated within the Hague Programme with the aim of concluding 
the establishment of the CEAS by 2010. However, this was postponed until 2012.   
Additionally, an asylum policy plan was presented, in 2008, by the European 
Commission with three main objectives: (i) to widen the scope and the harmonisation of the 
EU legislation, (ii) to create an EU agency for practical and effective cooperation, and (iii) 
to increase interstate solidarity and responsibility among the Member States and also non-
EU countries.52  
                                                          
50 Therefore, also non-EU citizens can cross internal borders without being subject to border checks. 
51 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member 
States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001). 
52 COM(2008) 360 final,  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Policy 
plan on asylum, An integrated approach to protection across the EU, Brussels, 17.6.2008. 
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The Lisbon Treaty introduced the objectives established in Tampere in the EU 
primary law by means of Article 78 TFEU. This article is the legal basis for the development 
of the CEAS and reads:  
“The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection, and 
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country 
national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement.” 
The adoption of the Stockholm Programme in 2009 highlighted the commitment of 
establishing “a common area of protection and solidarity based on a common asylum 
procedure and uniform status for those grated international protection”.53 A stronger and 
harmonised framework was settled with higher standards of protection of human rights and 
cooperation in order to achieve a fairer system, reducing the differences and treatment 
among Member States given to asylum seekers by a uniform application of asylum policies 
and solidarity among Member States.  Therefore, the legal framework of the CEAS was 
revised, and a new Dublin Regulation III adopted in 2013. 
Since then, due to the unprecedented migration crisis of 2015, the European 
Commission proposed a reform of the CEAS in 2016, “in order to move towards a fully 
efficient, fair and humane asylum policy – one which can function effectively both in times of 
normal and in times of high migratory pressure.”54 
Lastly, in the most recent European Council meeting, on 28 July 2018, the reform of 
the CEAS was again discussed among European leaders and the conclusion reached was that 
“[a]s regards the reform for a new Common European Asylum System, much progress has 
been achieved thanks to the tireless efforts of the Bulgarian and previous Presidencies. 
Several files are close to finalisation. A consensus needs to be found on the Dublin 
Regulation to reform it based on a balance of responsibility and solidarity, taking into 
account the persons disembarked following Search And Rescue operations. Further 
examination is also required on the Asylum Procedures proposal. The European Council 
                                                          
53 Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting the Citizens, 2010 (OJ C 115/1). 
54 European Commission, Press release, July 2016, Completing the reform of the Common European Asylum 
System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum policy, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2433_en.htm. 
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underlines the need to find a speedy solution to the whole package and invites the Council 
to continue work with a view to concluding as soon as possible.”55 
In light of the above, there are currently five main pieces of secondary law composing 
the CEAS: the revised Asylum Procedures Directive56, the revised Reception Conditions 
Directive57, the revised Qualification Directive58, the revised Dublin Regulation59, and the 
revised EURODAC Regulation60.  From these, only three legislative instruments which are 
part of the CEAS and intend to promote and enhance the principle of solidarity will be 
analysed in the next section.  
 
2.2 Operationalisation of Solidarity  
 
In light of the above, there are several instruments and tools which are intended to 
promote and enhance solidarity and the burden-sharing of responsibilities.61 Among them 
there are legislative mechanisms that are practical tools of solidarity, some of which will be 
addressed in the next section, specifically: the Dublin System, the Temporary Protection 
Directive, and relocation mechanisms. As will be shown, the Dublin System, which is the 
cornerstone of the CEAS, is not a system designed to share the burdens of migration among 
Member States and does not effectively implement solidarity. In reality, the “rule of State of 
                                                          
55 European Council Conclusions, 28 June 2018, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/pdf. 
56 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013).  
57 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards 
for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013). 
58 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for 
a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted  (OJ L 337, 20.12.2011). 
59 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person  (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013). 
60 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) 
No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law 
enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in 
the area of freedom, security and justice  (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013). 
61 As financial solidarity and Institutional building.  
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first entry” being the default rule creates serious imbalances between Member States. As, 
the responsibility for asylum seekers is based on a geographical criterion, Southern and 
Eastern Member States are disproportionally affected by migration inflows since they have 
the Union’s external borders.  
The asymmetries that Dublin generates among Member States created the need of 
establishing compensatory measures. Compensatory measures have at its core content the 
operationalisation of interstate solidarity. Relocation mechanisms were an example of intra-
compensatory measures used to address the migration crisis of 2015, by physical burden-
sharing. However, solidarity instruments depend on the political will and cooperation of the 
Member States to be fully efficient.  
 
2.2.1 The Dublin System  
 
As previously mentioned, the Dublin System is the cornerstone of the CEAS 
framework, having been established with the Dublin Convention of 1990, succeeded by the 
Dublin II (2003) and amended by Dublin III (2013). 
The Dublin Regulation determines which Member States are responsible for 
processing an asylum application and it is a political allocation of individual responsibility 
between Member States. The responsible Member State has the duty to examine and decide 
the asylum process, with the criterion for jurisdiction based on family links, certain 
documentation, the place of entry, or where the first application was lodged.62 The Member 
State of first entry is the default rule for the allocation of responsibility.63  
The system aims to guarantee the right to effective access to the asylum procedure 
and to prevent “forum shopping”.64 Therefore, one asylum seeker can only apply in one 
territory of the EU and in the event that there is a secondary movement to another Member 
State, he can be sent back to the country of the first entry. His preference is not an applicable 
criterion. If the application is rejected under that EU territory, the rejection is valid 
throughout all Member States.  
As mentioned above, the default rule aggravates the asymmetries between the states 
of the European Union due to geographical differences, and some Member States have 
                                                          
62 Articles 3, and 7 to 15 of Regulation 604/2013. 
63 Article 13(1) of Regulation 604/2013. 
64 Understanding as multiple applications in the EU territory from the same person.   
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become responsible for a disproportionate number of applications. The “rule of State of first 
entry” only intensifies the burden that is taken by the Member States with a favourable 
position for the entrance of third-country nationals. Thus, the default rule “allocates 
responsibilities on the basis of the arbitrary geographical location of a country” 65, as the 
key criterion of responsibility.   
In this light, the Dublin System is a source of huge controversy. Earlier in 2007, the 
Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System presented by the European 
Commission, stated that “the Dublin System may de facto result in additional burdens on 
Member States that have limited reception and absorption capacities and that find 
themselves under particular migratory pressures because of their geographical location.”66 
Many academics have raised several concerns regarding the Dublin System and the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities of Article 80 TFEU.  
Thus, according to BAST, the Dublin Regulation not only creates a system which is 
not based on solidarity, but can also be regarded as an infringement to Article 80 TFEU. If 
the EU institutions continue to not respond to the failure of the system by creating additional 
solidarity measures to correct and compensate for the failure of Dublin, “their inaction 
would thus be illegal”, since  “[i]rrespective of the broad measure of discretion of the EU 
legislature in its choice of the appropriate means, this infringement of the Treaty would 
provide a basis for action for failure to act pursuant to Article 265 TFEU.”67  MAIANI  recalls 
that the Dublin System fails to comply with its objectives and it “generates adverse effects 
for both asylum seekers and the operation of the CEAS.”68 GOLDNER LANG concludes that 
the Dublin System “creates a burden-shifting rather than a burden-sharing mechanism.”69 
Nevertheless, the necessity “to strike a balance between responsibility criteria in a spirit of 
solidarity” is emphasised in the preambular part of the Dublin Regulation III, notably in 
Recital 25. 
The truth is that the responsibilities regarding asylum procedures and duties are 
considered differently by the Member States, thus creating an imbalanced system. Solidarity 
                                                          
65 E. Küçük, “The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in Sharing Responsibility: More than Window 
Dressing?”, European Law Journal, 22, 2016, p.459. 
66 COM(2007) 301 final, European Commission, Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum 
System, Brussels, 6.6.2007, p.10. 
67 J. Bast, “Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law”, European Public 
Law, 22, 2016, p.297. 
68 F. Maiani, “The reform of the Dublin-system and the dystopia of ‘‘sharing people’’”, Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, 24(5), 2017, p.625. 
69 See I. Goldner Lang, “Is There Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU”, Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law and Policy, 9, 2013, p.13.  
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and fair sharing of responsibilities are crucial for the efficiency of the CEAS, and the case-
law having already emphasised deficiencies of the Dublin System, as well as breaches on 
the fundamental rights.70  
As seen in the 2015 migration crisis, compensatory measures had to be taken by the 
Union institutions due to the failure of Dublin. That fact “demonstrates a paradoxical dual 
role the Union institutions are asked to fulfil: on the one hand, they are called on to 
implement the common policies which cause the need for a correction in the first place, but 
on the other hand they are also responsible for making those very corrections based on 
solidarity.”71 The European Commission has already prepared a reform, the Dublin IV 
proposal, in order to revise and reform the current system. 72  
The Dublin IV Proposal intends to better regulate the responsibilities of Member 
States regarding asylum applications by ensuring solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibilities. Notwithstanding, the controversial “rule of State of first entry” is still 
sustained in the proposal, “[t]he current criteria for the allocation of responsibility are 
essentially preserved”, although “targeted changes are proposed, notably to strengthen 
family unity under Dublin by extending the family definition”. 73  Therefore, there are new 
rules on the allocation of responsibility of Member States regarding family ties.  
Moreover, the proposal creates a corrective allocation mechanism that shall 
complement the criteria set out in Dublin IV. In a situation when a Member State is dealing 
with a disproportional number of applications, the mechanism would be activated 
automatically.  Therefore, “[i]t should mitigate any significant disproportionality in the 
share of asylum applications between Member States resulting from the application of the 
responsibility criteria” and “ensuring an appropriate system of responsibility sharing 
between Member States.”74 
This new mechanism is similar to the ones established in the decisions on relocation 
taken in 2015. The corrective allocation mechanism is also “based on a reference key, 
                                                          
70 See M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, ECtHR, 21 January 2011; and Joined Cases C 
411/10 and C 493/10, N.S. and M.E., EU:C:2011:865. 
71 J. Bast, “Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law”, European Public 
Law, 22, 2016, p.303. 
72 COM(2016) 270 final, European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person (recast), Brussels, 4.5.2016. 
73 See Chapter III, Articles 9 to 12 of the new proposal. 
74 See p.18 and 14 of the new proposal. 
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allowing for adjustments in allocation of applicants in certain circumstances”75,  however, 
the new scheme is to be permanently considered. 76 
The most recent meeting of the European Council stressed that “consensus needs to 
be found on the Dublin Regulation to reform it based on a balance of responsibility and 
solidarity”.77  
 
2.2.2 The Temporary Protection Directive  
 
The Temporary Protection Directive is part of the CEAS’ legal framework. It was an 
exceptional measure established at the time of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in the 
Kosovo refugees’ crisis of 1999 with the purpose of burden sharing responsibilities.78 
The provision of Article 25 of the Directive recalls “a spirit of Community 
solidarity”. The principle of solidarity is the rationale behind the directive. Furthermore, as 
specified in Recital 20 of the Directive, the objective is “the attainment of a balance of effort 
between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving displaced 
persons”, which is in accordance with Article 80 TFEU. In N.S, when referring to the 
relevant EU legislation in the CEAS concerning the principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility among Member States, the CJEU mentioned the Temporary Protection 
Directive as an example of a solidarity mechanism.79  
However, the Directive only settles minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection to third-country nationals who cannot return to their home in the event of a mass 
influx of displaced persons. Moreover, the Directive merely provides a solidarity mechanism 
for Member States when facing a situation of a massive inflow of people arriving in their 
territory. The mechanism consists in the physical relocation of beneficiaries of temporary 
protection to another Member State. The mechanism is based on the principle of 
                                                          
75 See Recital 31 to 35; and Chapter VII, Articles 34 to 43 of the new proposal. 
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volunteerism, which allows Member States to establish their quotas in accordance with their 
capacity to receive those persons, and the person to be transferred must also consent it.80  
Despite the migration crisis of 2015, the Directive which is based on solidarity was 
not applied. As a consequence, the European institutions, under their discretionary power, 
have decided to establish different solidarity mechanisms. In their view, a voluntary 
mechanism would have not been enough to address the crisis, as will be seen below in 
Slovakia and Hungary v Council. 
 
2.2.3 The Relocation Measures  
 
Relocation measures are considered to be the resettlement of beneficiaries or 
applicants for international protection in a different Member State from the one that was 
previously responsible for handling his application, under the Dublin System. The Member 
State of relocation is responsible for the beneficiary or applicant by taking integration 
measures or by examining the application procedure.  
Relocation schemes have been established as ad hoc measures of limited duration, 
being used in emergency situations where Member States’ capacities are exhausted due to 
the disproportionate burdens that have been imposed on them. Therefore, these measures 
have a compensatory logic inherent to the solidarity principle, mostly due to the impacts of 
the Dublin System and geographical location. However, relocation measures have in practice 
a limited scope due to political factors and the willingness of the Member States.  
In 2009, the EUREMA project was implemented in Malta as a Pilot Project for intra-
EU Relocation.81 The objective of the project was to assist Malta in preparing and 
implementing the relocation of recognised beneficiaries of international protection to other 
Member States. It was based on the principle of “double voluntariness” – from the 
participating countries and the beneficiaries.  The EASO fact finding report on intra-EU 
relocation activities from Malta, concluded that “most respondents maintained that 
participation in relocation should remain voluntary, based on a political decision.” 82 
                                                          
80 Article 25 and 26 of the Directive 2001/55. 
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In 2015, during the migration crisis, the Council adopted two relocation decisions in 
for the benefit of Greece and Italy. These decisions aimed to reinforce internal solidarity 
between the EU Member States and the commitment of the Member States to share the 
migration burden.  
The first relocation decision was drafted on a voluntary basis providing for relocation 
mechanisms of 40 000 persons from Italy and Greece.83 In addition, another decision for a 
relocation mechanism was taken by the Council, creating a binding system based on fixed 
quotas to relocate a number of 120 000 persons. 84 The relocation decisions were adopted 
under the provision of Article 78(3), which reads:  
“In the event of one or more Member States being confronted with an emergency 
situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for 
the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the 
European Parliament.” 
Article 78(3) TFEU, a specific provision to deal with emergency conditions caused by a 
sudden inflow of third-country nationals, is an exceptional provision by nature, triggered by 
the EU institutions due to the Mediterranean crisis and establishing a relocation mechanism 
in light of Article 80 TFEU. The measures taken under Article 78(3) TFEU were of a 
temporary nature, having established a provisional period of 24 months from their entry into 
force. 
The emergency relocation mechanisms were based on a distribution scheme which 
allocates binding quotas to Member States. Indeed, applicants were distributed in a 
proportional manner, with the distribution key of these numbers in the Member States of 
relocation being based on the size of their population, the total GDP, the average number of 
asylum applications per one million inhabitants in their territory over the period 2010-2014, 
and their unemployment rate. Despite the scheme derogating from the Dublin System, this 
was only partially so, as it was more precisely a derogation from the default rule, the “rule 
of State of first entry” and its procedural steps.85   
The Decisions provided a payment of a lump sum of 6000 Euros for each applicant 
relocated to the Member States of relocation. Italy and Greece, regarding costs of transfer, 
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received a lump sum of at least 500 euros for each relocated person, as provided in Article 
10 of the contested decision. This solution reflected the financial solidarity also involved in 
the process.  
The second decision was the one contested in Slovakia and Hungary v Council, which 
provided a binding allocation mechanism, and entered into force on 25 September 2015 and 
was to be applied until 26 September 2017.  
 
3. Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v Council 
 
3.1 The Facts  
 
As previously mentioned, in September 2015 the Council adopted two decisions on 
the relocation of migrants in the EU. While the first relocation decision was adopted 
unanimously, the second, which was latter contested in the CJEU, was adopted by a qualified 
majority, with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia voting against its 
adoption and Finland abstaining. 
The so-called “Visegrad group”, composed of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia not only opposed but also refused to comply with the decisions. Consequently, 
Slovakia and Hungary, supported by Poland, brought actions seeking the annulment of the 
decision to the CJEU. Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and 
the European Commission intervened in the case in support of the Council.  
 
3.2 The Pleas   
 
Slovakia and Hungary, supported by Poland, raised several pleas in law which were 
based on three main concerns: (i) the legal basis related to the institutional power to adopt 
it, claiming that Article 78(3) TFEU was not the appropriate legal basis for the contested 
decision; (ii) the procedure taken after adopting the decision, associated with the lawfulness 
of the procedure leading to the adoption of the contested decision and alleging breach of 
essential procedural requirements; and lastly, (iii) substantive pleas regarding the principle 
of proportionality of the decision, where the CJEU addressed solidarity complaints. For the 
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purpose of this dissertation, only the substantive pleas related to the principle of solidarity 
within the asylum policy of the Union will be analysed further.   
 
3.3 Arguments of the Parties 
 
In Slovakia’s 6th plea and Hungary’s 9th and 10th pleas, the parties claimed that the 
contested decision breached the principle of proportionality. 
Slovakia argued that the contested decision was not appropriate to attain its objective 
since the mechanism could not address structural defects of the Italian and Greek asylum 
systems. The small number of relocations also reinforced the notion that the measure was 
inappropriate. In addition, the contested decision was unnecessary, since the objective of 
that decision could have been achieved by other measures. Slovakia suggested several 
measures, such as the implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive since the 
objective of that directive was in essence the same as the contested decision. The Temporary 
Protection Directive would not affect the sovereignty of the Member States as the contested 
decision, since it is a voluntary-based mechanism. Moreover, it was not necessary to impose 
an additional measure since the contested decision had been taken “only eight days after”86 
the first relocation decision, which was also taken in a spirit of solidarity.  
Due to the migration route, the European Commission put forward a proposal in 
September 2009 where Hungary was classified as a frontline Member State, beneficiary of 
the relocation mechanisms. 87 However, Hungary rejected that classification and, therefore, 
the proposal was amended with Hungary being considered as a Member State of relocation. 
Consequently, Hungary claimed that since it was no longer a beneficiary Member State of 
relocation, the number of 120 000 persons to be relocated was contrary to the principle of 
necessity and proportionality. That number both exceeded the necessary amount and was 
inconsistent with the principle of proportionality. The failure to reduce 54 000 persons that 
were initially to be relocated from Hungary was not justified. Subsequently, Hungary 
claimed the partial annulment of the decision as an alternative, “insofar as it concerns 
Hungary”.88 The decision would be unlawful to that Member State because Hungary was in 
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a similar emergency situation as Italy and Greece. Therefore, Hungary affirmed that the 
mandatory quotas infringed the objective of Article 78(3) TFEU and the principle of 
proportionality, since it had imposed additional and disproportional burdens on Hungary. 
However, Hungary affirmed “its share of the common burden”89 by supporting the 
beneficiary Member States, thus not violating the principle of solidarity.  
Lastly, Poland presented an argument based on ethnic and security concerns. Some 
Member States would have to bear heavier and disproportional burdens due to their 
“virtually ethnically homogeneous” 90 population, with a different cultural and linguistic 
background in comparison to the persons to be relocated. Furthermore, the contested 
decision interfered with the right and responsibility to maintain law and order, as well as 
internal security of Member States as provided in Article 72 TFEU. 
In response to Slovakia, the Council stated that the contested decision was considered 
appropriate to attain the objective of the measure, which aimed to relieve the pressure on the 
Italian and Greek asylum systems. The Council affirmed that even an asylum system “with 
no structural weaknesses”91 would have probably been affected by such a massive inflow 
of persons. Furthermore, at the time of the adoption, the Council held that there were no 
other substitute measures that would permit efficient pursuit of the objective while 
simultaneously affecting the sovereignty of Member States as little as possible. The 
Temporary Protection Directive was not a solution in regards to this case, since the system 
entailed in the directive is to provide temporary protection to persons who are already 
entitled to that protection in the Member States where they are present. This was not the case 
since the reception facilities in Italy and Greece were saturated with people that could not be 
entitled to that protection.  
In its reply to Hungary, the Council stated that in light of the statistics available at 
the time of the adoption of the decision, it could properly take the view that it was necessary 
to relocate 120 000 persons, even after Hungary withdrew from the status of beneficiary 
Member State. The number of 54 000 persons that were initially to be relocated from 
Hungary was to be adapted to the migration circumstances “in the desire for solidarity, 
effectiveness and proportionality.”92 Lastly, the Council stated that the last Hungarian plea 
was not admissible since the decision was an indivisible one. Moreover, at the time of the 
                                                          
89 Para. 290 of the Opinion.  
90 Para. 302 of the Judgement.  
91 Para. 232 of the Opinion.  
92 Para. 283 of the Opinion. 
29 
adoption of the decision, Hungary was no longer in a situation as established by Article 78(3) 
TFEU, so its inclusion as a relocation Member State was justifiable. Furthermore, the 
contested decision provided that the mechanism could be suspended by the request of a 
Member State.  
 
3.4 The Opinion of the Advocate General BOT  
 
In his first observations, Advocate General (hereinafter ‘AG’) BOT makes an explicit 
reference to the principle of solidarity and further development of the background of the 
principle. He affirms that “[t]he contested decision is an expression of the solidarity which 
the Treaty envisages between Member States.”93 Furthermore, “solidarity is among the 
carinal values of the Union and is even among the foundations of the Union” and addressing 
solidarity as the “raison d´être and the objective of the European project”.94 He states that 
the solidarity principle is a founding value, a “pillar and at the same time a guiding principle 
of the European Union’s policies on border checks, asylum and immigration”. 95 
In the Opinion, it is stated that, in light of Article 80 TFEU, the measures established 
in the contested decision translate into the practical content of the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibility between Member States. Therefore, “[w]ith that decision, 
solidarity between Member States has a specific content and a binding nature.”96  
In a strong statement, the AG affirmed that: 
“[t]hat opposition, together with the finding of a very incomplete application of the 
contested decision, to which I shall return below, may give the impression that, 
behind what is by common consent called the ‘2015 migration crisis’, another crisis 
is concealed, namely the crisis of the European integration project, which is to a 
large extent based on a requirement for solidarity between the Member States which 
have decided to take part in that project.”97  
Consequently, a strong point was made regarding the importance of the solidarity 
principle and its legal and valid enforceable nature in the initial part of the AG Opinion.  
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In accordance with the alleged breach of the principle of proportionality on 
Slovakia’s 6th plea and Hungary’s 9th and 10th pleas, the AG addressed firstly the 
appropriateness of the decision for attaining the objective it pursues. 
To begin with, AG BOT stated that the decision could considerably relieve the 
pressure of the Italian and Greek asylum systems, and that the main objective of the decision 
was not to fix structural defects. The AG shared the vision of the Council that, even any 
asylum system without any structural defect would have been seriously disrupted and, 
therefore, the contested decision effectively contributed to its real objective, which was 
relieving the pressure of those asylum systems.  
Regarding the argument on the small number of relocations carried out, the AG 
considered that the Council relied on detailed data and analysed the causes and effects of the 
crisis that was available at the time of the adoption of the contested decision. The low number 
of compliances with the contested decision may be due to several factors that were not 
foreseen at the time of the adoption. AG BOT used this argument to call back on the “‘laisser 
passer’ policy” of some Member States “and the insufficient cooperation of certain Member 
States in the implementation of the contested decision.”.98 Here, AG BOT directly addressed 
the Member States who brought the action, further stressing “that the applicants’ argument 
amounts, all in all, to an attempt to take advantage of their failure to implement the contested 
decision. I would point out that, by failing to comply with their relocation obligations, the 
Slovak Republic and Hungary have contributed to the fact that the objective (…) is to date 
still far from being attained.”99 Moreover, the AG claimed that the emergency mechanism 
could have been successfully applicable but “only on condition that all the Member States, 
in the same spirit of solidarity as that which constitutes its raison d’être, make an effort to 
implement it.”100  
Therefore, he clearly stated the legal enforceability of Article 80 TFEU and the 
failure of the duty to act in solidarity:  
“[i]t should be borne in mind, in that regard, that the non-application of the 
contested decision also constitutes a breach of the obligation concerning solidarity 
and the fair sharing of burdens expressed in Article 80 TFEU. (…) in an action for 
                                                          
98 Para. 238.  
99 Para. 239.  
100 Para. 241.  
31 
failure to fulfil obligations on this matter, the Court would be entitled to remind the 
offending Member States of their obligations”.101  
Thus, the CJEU is entitled to recall this obligation to the Member States which are 
legally bound by it. 
Regarding necessity, AG BOT considered that  “although at least some of the 
alternative solutions suggested by the Slovak Republic could contribute to the attainment of 
the objective pursued by the contested decision, that finding, having regard to the broad 
margin of discretion that must be afforded to the Council, cannot suffice to establish that 
that decision is manifestly disproportionate and to call its legality into question.”102 At the 
time of the adoption, in his view, the Council was entitled to decide that no alternative 
measures would be as effective, even if they would impose less on the sovereignty of the 
Member States. The AG agreed with the view put forward by Germany claiming that the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility of Article 80 TFEU, “plays a major 
role in the interpretation of Article 78(3)” and “the provisional measure such as the 
contested decision should allocate between the Member States, in a binding fashion, the 
burdens which it imposes.”103  
In regards to the alternative of the Temporary Protection Directive, the AG 
mentioned that even though they seem similar, the voluntary consent differentiates them. 
The argument taken on the basis that the objective of the contested decision could be pursued 
under voluntary commitments, for the AG “does not bear scrutiny”104, since the very genesis 
of implementing a binding mechanism was because of that lack of consensus between 
Member States. Therefore, the contested decision was the result of the Council’s political 
choice and could not be qualified as manifestly inappropriate or incorrect. Regarding the 
adoption of a previous relocation mechanism, notably Decision 2015/1523, the AG argued 
that as forwarded by the European Commission, the migration situation had deteriorated, 
resulting in the need for an additional measure. 
To respond to the arguments put forward by Hungary, AG BOT referred that the 
Council adjusted the number of migrants to be relocated in a reasonable way concerning the 
data available at the time. The Council took into account the need to reduce the pressure on 
the asylum systems and that the number established would not place an extreme burden on 
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Member States of relocation. Accordingly, AG BOT considered that the Council did not 
exceed its margin of discretion. 
Considering the number of 54 000 persons to be relocated initially from Hungary, a 
number was established that considered the evolution of the migration situation, adjustable 
and flexible to new data. Consequently, the Council did not act in a disproportionate manner 
or go beyond what was necessary to achieve the objective.  
Responding to Hungary’s claim of partial annulment in so far as it affected Hungary, 
AG set forth that said solution would affect the essential element of the contested decision, 
the very principle of solidarity. In fact: 
“[t]hat would affect an essential element of the contested decision, namely the 
mandatory determination of the allocations per Member State which gives real scope 
to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member 
States laid down in Article 80 TFEU.”105, and “the idea of a distribution of the 
applicants for international protection who have arrived in Italy and Greece among 
all the other Member States is a fundamental element of the contested decision. The 
limitation of the scope ratione territoriae of the contested decision that would result 
from the partial annulment of that decision would thus strike at the very heart of the 
decision.”106  
Indeed, due to Hungary’s refusal as beneficiary of the mechanism, and in accordance 
with the principle of solidarity, it had to be considered as a Member State of relocation. AG 
BOT concluded that “the burdens (…) in favour of one or more Member States in an 
emergency migratory situation must be shared among all the other Member States.”107 
Moreover, Article 4(5) and 9 of the contested decision gave the right to Member States of 
relocation to request the suspension of their obligations.108 Therefore, the Council “has 
succeeded in reconciling the principle of solidarity with the taking into account of the 
particular needs that some Member States may have owing to the evolution of migratory 
flows.  Such a reconciliation seems to me, moreover, to be perfectly consistent with Article 
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80 TFEU, which, as will be seen on a careful reading, provides for the ‘fair sharing of 
responsibility’ … between Member States.”109  
Regarding the security claim made by Poland, AG BOT considered that the contested 
decision fully takes into consideration the national security and public order of the Member 
States.110 
In conclusion, AG BOT did not uphold any of the pleas raised by the Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland, and considered that the actions should be dismissed.  
 
3.5 The Decision of the CJEU  
 
The CJEU judgement was in line with the AG BOT Opinion, the former also 
underlining the principle of solidarity in its judgement, despite not emphasising the principle 
as strongly as the Opinion. 
The CJEU started by referring that measures taken under Article 78(3) TFEU 
entailed a political choice and complex assessments where the EU institutions enjoy a broad 
discretion. 
It stated that the measure could not be considered as manifestly inappropriate for 
working towards the objective of relieving the pressure of those asylum systems. It was 
“hard to deny”111 that any asylum system would have been seriously affected in a similar 
situation, as the AG had highlighted. It mentioned that the relocation mechanism 
supplements other measures with the same objective: for instance, the case of the European 
programme of resettlement; the first relocation decision, Decision 2015/153; and the 
establishment of hotspots. Considering the low number of relocated people, the CJEU held 
that the numbers could be explained, for instance, by “the lack of cooperation on the part of 
certain Member States.”112 Therefore, the decision was not manifestly incorrect nor 
inappropriate for attaining the objective pursued. 
 The arguments raised by Slovakia regarding the necessity of the contested decision 
and possible alternative measures were rejected. The CJEU recalled that the Council tried to 
implement a less restrictive measure: the first voluntary relocation mechanism. The Council 
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was entitled, within the scope of its discretion, to opt for a binding mechanism in accordance 
with the statistical data provided at the time, as “the Council considered it vital to show 
solidarity towards those two Member States”113 Moreover, the Council was even bound to 
take a suitable measure in order to give an appropriate response to the emergency crises.  
By adopting the contested decision, it “was in fact required (…) to give effect to the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, 
between the Member States, which applies, under Article 80 TFEU, when the EU common 
policy on asylum is implemented.”114 
In response to the alternative solutions of the Temporary Protection Directive, the 
CJEU agreed with the arguments put forward by the Council and stated that the Directive 
did not provide a proper solution to the problem or a satisfactory response to the need of 
relieving the significant pressure on the Italian and Greek asylum systems.   
Regarding Hungarian pleas, the CJEU reaffirmed that the Council concluded that 
only a significant number of applicants could actually reduce the pressure of the Italian and 
Greek asylum systems and therefore it did not commit a manifest error of assessment.  
 Additionally, the CJEU did not deny that the binding relocation mechanism created 
consequences for the relocation Member States in response to the claim for partial annulment 
of the Decision. The need to achieve a balance “between the different interests involved”115, 
taking into consideration the objective of the contested decision, was emphasized by the 
CJEU. Moreover, “the attempt to strike such a balance, taking into account not the 
particular situation of a single Member State, but that of all Member States, cannot be 
regarded as being contrary to the principle of proportionality.”116 The CJEU stated that:  
“[w]hen one or more Member States are faced with an emergency situation within 
the meaning of Article 78(3) TFEU, the burdens entailed by the provisional measures 
adopted under that provision for the benefit of that or those Member States must, as 
a rule, be divided between all the other Member States, in accordance with the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States, 
since, in accordance with Article 80 TFEU, that principle governs EU asylum 
policy.”117  
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Therefore “the Commission and the Council rightly considered (….), that the 
distribution of the relocated applicants among all the Member States, in keeping with the 
principle laid down in Article 80 TFEU, was a fundamental element of the contested 
decision.”118  
Thus, Hungary must be considered in the same manner as all the other Member 
States, having the duty to share the burden with the other Member States by the allocation 
of quotas, and “the Council cannot be criticised (…) for having concluded on the basis of 
the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility laid down in Article 80 TFEU 
that Hungary had to be allocated relocation quotas in the same way as all the other Member 
States that were not beneficiaries of the relocation mechanism.”119  
Lastly, the ethnical argument put forward by Poland was considered inadmissible. 
The CJEU expressed that if the relocation mechanism was to be conditioned on cultural or 
linguistic ties between the applicants and the Member State of relocation, it would be 
impossible to adopt the mechanism and thus respect the principle of solidarity laid down in 
Article 80 TFEU. A mention to the ethnical origin of the applicants was clearly contrary to 
the Union law, more precisely to Article 21 of the Charter. Lastly, on the issues of 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, the CJEU stated that 
these issues were taken into consideration within the relocation process. Member States 
should administratively work together within the “spirit of cooperation and mutual trust 
must prevail”.120 
As such, the CJEU did not accept any pleas in law put forward by Slovakia, Hungary, 
or Poland, and the actions were fully dismissed.  
 
3.6 Critical Remarks  
 
In Slovakia and Hungary v Council, the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibilities was emphasised throughout the substantive pleas of the judgement when 
addressing the principle of proportionality.  
AG BOT, in his Opinion, addressed the principle remarkably, more so than the CJEU. 
When reading his first observations, the AG had an outstanding interpretation of the 
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principle of solidarity, affirming it as a founding and “cardinal value” of the Union.121 
Furthermore, AG BOT affirmed solidarity as the “the raison d’être and the objective of the 
European project”122 whereas the CJEU did not pronounce on the nature of solidarity as a 
founding value of the Union. Contrastingly, the CJEU addressed solidarity as a principle of 
EU asylum law.123 I think that a stronger approach could have been held, placing solidarity 
as a founding value of the Union and one of its objectives.  
The CJEU noticed how the solidarity principle plays a crucial role when adopting 
secondary legislation, due to the contested decision being a legislative measure which 
operationalised solidarity. Thus, by adopting the relocation decision, the Council gave 
“effect to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, (…), between the 
Member States.”124 The CJEU widened the practical content of the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibilities, as has been expressed by the AG in paras.16 and 22 of 
his Opinion.  
The CJEU pointed out that the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibilities governs EU asylum law, recognising and reinforcing the important role of 
Article 80 TFEU, particularly in paras. 252, 291 to 293, and in para. 329 of the judgement. 
Therefore, Article 80 TFEU and the principle therein were reinforced as a clear guidance to 
asylum policies taken by the Union. 
Moreover, whereas AG BOT, clearly states that “solidarity between Member States 
has a specific content and a binding nature”125 and “that the non-application of the contested 
decision also constitutes a breach of the obligation concerning solidarity and the fair 
sharing of burdens expressed in Article 80 TFEU”126, the CJEU did not elaborate further on 
the legal enforceability of the principle.  
However, I believe that by upholding the legality of the measure, the CJEU declared 
that solidarity can be imposed by legally binding measures. Therefore, solidarity has a 
compulsory nature and should not be regarded as a voluntary commitment between Member 
States, as claimed. What is more, the CJEU acknowledge the existence of legal duties 
                                                          
121 Para. 17 of the Opinion. 
122 Ibid.  
123 See H. Labayle, “La solidarité n’est pas une valeur: la validation de la relocalisation temporaire des 
demandeurs d’asile par la Cour de justice (CJUE, 6 septembre 2017, Slovaquie et Hongrie c. Conseil, C-643/15 
et C-647/15)”, available at http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2017/09/07/asile/solidarite-nest-valeur-validation-de-
relocalisation-temporaire-demandeurs-dasile-cour-de-justice-cjue-6-septembre-2017-slovaquie-hongrie-c-
consei/ (last accessed on 27 July 2018). 
124 Para. 252 of the Judgement.  
125 Para. 23 of the Opinion. 
126 Para. 242 of the Opinion. 
37 
flowing from the principle of solidarity. Thus, Member States are bound to effectively 
implement the compulsory relocation decision, despite the cultural and ethnical background 
of the applicants. 
Regarding the meaning and conceptualisation of solidarity, the Court again failed to 
clarify the concept. Notwithstanding, the CJEU provided some characteristics of its content 
through its judgement. For instance, in the claims regarding the non-application of the 
decision in so far as it concerned Hungary, the CJEU identified that solidarity measures 
could not be framed for the interests of some Member States. It is to be shared among all the 
Member States and a balance must be achieved regarding the fair distribution of burdens and 
proportionality. The very fundamental essence of the decision is indeed the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, which cannot be divided. Hungary must be 
considered in the same manner as all the other Member States, having the duty to share the 
burden as the others, through the allocation of quotas.127 Notwithstanding, the CJEU 
acknowledged that when applying the principle of solidarity, there are Member States 
beneficiaries of solidarity. 128 In fact, this is part of the essence of solidarity. 
I believe that the political force of the judgement can be as important as its legal 
dimension. Even if there are doubts about the legal enforceability of the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities of Article 80 TFEU, the Court provided a clear 
and strong message to Member States: solidarity governs EU asylum law and Member States 
have to fulfil their duties of solidarity by effectively implementing the binding relocation 
mechanism. Member States must share the burden of migration in fair terms, even if it is 
contrary to their national interests yet in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
Although it is clear that solidarity mechanisms are highly dependent on the political will of 
national governments, the CJEU reinforced the legal value of the principle and the scope of 
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Solidarity has been a fundamental basis of integration and promotion of peace since 
the creation of the Union. The Lisbon Treaty strengthened and accomplished solidarity as a 
founding value of the Union and a fundamental principle of EU law. Therefore, Member 
States are to fulfil and effectively implement legal obligations stemming from solidarity 
measures created by the Union. 
The AFSJ, in particular the European migration policies, have always been 
influenced by the political concerns of Member States. Their national concerns are often 
connected with moral and security issues. The inclusion of solidarity provisions in the AFSJ 
and the creation and development of the CEAS were a great achievement for the cohesion 
of the Union. Interstate solidarity is pivotal for the functioning of both the CEAS and the 
Union.  
However, the truth is that the migration crisis of 2015 exposed the deficiencies of the 
CEAS’ legal framework, putting at a crisis a fundamental European value. The Dublin 
System reinforced inequalities among Member States through its “rule of State of first 
entry”. Consequently, compensatory measures had to be taken, having the Union introduced 
the relocation decisions as a burden-share system based on intra-EU solidarity. The decisions 
fundamentally upheld the solidarity principle among Member States.  
Notwithstanding, nationalists and right-wing movements have emerged as political 
forces all over Europe, basing their policies on national interests. Arguments for 
homogeneity and the calling to terrorism threats have been emphasised.  Borders and fences 
have been built. The “Visegrad group” has been approaching and defending obligations 
towards solidarity as discretionary, as a “flexible solidarity” concept.129 Many have tried to 
justify the non-compliance with solidarity obligations from these Member States as a 
political situation, a lack of understanding of EU solidarity and values, as well a lack of 
integration of these Member States. 
In Slovakia and Hungary v Council, the CJEU upheld the legal enforceability of the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities, in a very politicised case. Despite 
the indirect approach to the legal enforceability of solidarity throughout the judgement, the 
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duty to act in solidarity was reinforced within the decision. A clear message was left to the 
Member States.  
In spite of the CJEU judgement, the “Visegrad group” continues not to comply with 
their duties of solidarity by denying participation in the scheme. Until March 2018, Hungary 
and Poland had not relocated a single person, the Czech Republic relocated 12, and Slovakia 
16 people. 130 The remaining Member States are still applying the relocation quotas, albeit 
in a slow and ineffective manner. Indeed, the attitude of European States towards solidarity 
was feeble to say the least. The failure of intra-EU solidarity was due to its own Members, 
which also demonstrates the lack of mutual trust and sincere cooperation in the EU. 
The compulsory relocation decision is a concrete example that solidarity in the EU 
is strictly dependent on national governments and their political willingness. In fact, the 
compliance with solidarity duties should be firmly monitored by the EU and enforcement 
mechanisms be taken. Indeed, the European Commission has already introduced 
infringement procedures against Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland for the failure to 
correctly implement the relocation decisions. In that regard, the European Commission, in 
December 2017, decided to refer these Member States to the CJEU for the non-compliance 
with their obligations regarding relocation decisions.131  
Meanwhile, Europe remains divided in regards to its asylum policies. In reality, 2018 
continues to see the European institutions and its Member States still trying to effectively 
and responsibly respond to the migration situation. Migration was discussed among 
European leaders in the most recent European Council meeting, where commitments to a 
comprehensive approach towards migration were reaffirmed. Even so, the Union and its 
leaders remain divided by politics, ideas, and concerns. The focus now is to increase an 
effective control of Union external borders and stop illegal migration deviating the focus 
from solidarity. 
The reform of the Dublin regulation has yet to be approved since 2016. It seems that 
any agreement on the long-term, and any responsible solution for migration is still in the 
distant future. It is curious that a new corrective allocation mechanism is proposed in the 
European Commission’s proposal which in essence is another relocation scheme, similar to 
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the previously adopted ones. Due to the feeble level of implementation of the relocation 
decisions, I believe that this type of burden-sharing instruments is not effective in a divided 
EU in matters of its asylum policies. 
In sum, despite of its axiological centrality in the construction of Europe, the 
principle of solidarity is at a crisis within the EU. Intra-physical measures of burden sharing 
have not been an effective way to tackle the migration crisis since they are strictly dependent 
on the political level of implementation and contribution of Member States. As GOLDNER 
LANG concludes “EU Solidarity coincides with national border.”132 
As Europe stands today, it can be concluded that interstate solidarity is in the midst 
of a crisis, as is the EU itself, (at least the EU as we now know it to be). Political 
unwillingness regarding solidarity in asylum policies prevails.  However, the European 
Union still has in its hands a powerful option of triggering Article 7 TEU, which intends to 
safeguard and promote European values.  Solidarity, as entrenched in Article 2 TEU, is a 
founding and guiding value of the Union, together with the respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. European 
institutions may activate the provision of Article 7(1) TEU when “there is a clear risk of a 
serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2”, as a preventive 
mechanism. Article 7(2) TEU states that if the breach of EU fundamental values is serious 
and persists, the Union can activate this provision, as a sanction mechanism, where certain 
rights may be suspended such as “voting rights of the representative of the government of 
that Member State in the Council.” Thus, the triggering of Article 7 may be an additional 
option to foster political willingness to encourage Member States towards more solidarity 
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